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The Demand for Corporate Financial Reporting: 






We examine financial analysts’ views on corporate financial reporting issues by means of a 
survey among 306 analysts and interviews among 21 analysts and compare their views with that 
of CFOs. Since CFOs believe that meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts and managing earnings 
to achieve this benchmark can enhance firm value, examining analysts’ perspectives on these 
actions improves our understanding on whether CFOs’ beliefs are rational or heuristic. Our 
findings suggest that CFOs’ beliefs tend to be rational regarding their focus on earnings and their 
views on earnings management and smoothing. The main reason is that analysts have difficulty 
in unraveling certain types of earnings management in a specific firm even though they 
anticipate earnings management in general. Yet, CFOs are heuristic in their optimism about the 






In making decisions on corporate financial reporting issues, analysts – as consumers of financial 
information – play an important role in the eyes of the managers. Empirical evidence indicates 
that managers seek to meet or slightly beat analysts’ forecasts (e.g., Brown and Caylor (2005)) 
and, if necessary, tend to manage their earnings to reach this goal.1 According to Graham, 
Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005), CFOs believe that those actions have real consequences for the 
value of their firm. However, if these managers think that they can steer analysts’ beliefs by 
managing reported earnings, the question that arises is how analysts perceive and respond to 
earnings management. On the one hand, analysts have incentives to go along with manipulated 
earnings, thereby maximizing forecast accuracy, either because of their inability to detect 
earnings management or because they behave strategically and collude with managers. On the 
other hand, their reputation concerns incentivize them to show their ability to detect earnings 
management and incorporate it in their reports.2
In case analysts adjust their expectations based on managed earnings, it will be rational 
for managers to actually manage their reported earnings. If not, the question arises why managers 
would inflate their reported earnings. Managers can be “trapped” into managing earnings, 
 These conflicting incentives have implications 
for their corporate financial reporting preferences.  
                                                 
1 See, amongst others, Baber, Fairfield, and Haggard (1991), Dechow and Sloan (1991), Ayers, Jiang, and Yeung 
(2006), and Roychowdhury (2006). 
2 In a review on the corporate financial reporting environment, Beyer, Cohen, Lys, and Walther (2010) summarize 
analysts’ incentives in disclosing their expectations as follows: (1) to maximize their reputation, (2) to optimize the 
reaction of the receivers (incl. investors or the firm’s management) to their reports, and (3) to maximize the value of 
their forecast to investors. 
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because the market expects them to manage earnings (e.g., Stein, 1989). Alternatively, managers 
might be heuristic believing that they can alter analysts’ expectations, while practice suggests 
otherwise. Verrecchia (2003, 2010) describes this type of heuristic as the behavior that results 
from the belief that individuals associate reported accounting measures of performance with real 
economic performance without being able to disentangle the two. Managers’ corresponding 
behavior is to focus predominantly on earnings-based performance measures and to view 
transparent accounting disclosure improvements as wealth increasing.3
We use large-scale survey and interview evidence to investigate analysts’ views on 
corporate financial reporting policies, including earnings benchmarks, within GAAP earnings 
management, and earnings smoothing. The questions we ask analysts are similar to the questions 
Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005) asked to CFOs, enabling us to provide additional insights 
into managers’ believes and the role of analysts. Because analysts are not likely to admit that 
they are unable or unmotivated to unravel earnings management, this design also allows us to 
draw inferences about their behavior and motivations. With a response rate of 48%, we examine 
the opinions of 306 analysts that work for 11 of the world’s largest investment banks. We 
complement the survey responses with 21 interviews with analysts. 
 Barth (2010) points out 
that the behavior of analysts might contribute to heuristic behavior by managers. In this paper, 
managers are heuristic when they manage earnings believing that they can influence analysts’ 
valuations, despite the fact that in reality analysts see through the managed earnings.  
Because CFOs believe that earnings rather than cash flows is the most important 
performance metric for outsiders, we first ask analysts about the most important performance 
                                                 
3 See for instance Fischer and Verrecchia (2004), who model managers’ heuristic behavior as an explanation for 
transparently biased disclosures in a Cournot product market setting.  
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metric. We find that, similar to CFOs, analysts also focus on earnings, and that they do so 
because of their client base. Independent of whether analysts or their client base are the driver 
behind this preference, we argue that CFOs are rational by focusing on earnings. Furthermore, 
we find that analysts view their own forecast as the most important performance benchmark, 
followed by the consensus analyst forecast.  
Our results also suggest that analysts anticipate firms to manage earnings to the 
benchmark. In particular, analysts’ answers indicate that they derive long-term consequences 
from meeting or missing short-term earnings benchmarks. Even though analysts tend to search 
for the underlying reasons behind missing a benchmark, they develop a negative view on firms 
that do so. The implications for managers are twofold. On the one hand, analysts’ negative view 
creates incentives for managers to continue managing earnings to the benchmark. On the other 
hand, analysts’ anticipation suggests that CFOs are heuristic in their earnings management 
efforts.  
However, anticipation of earnings management to reach a benchmark does not 
automatically mean that analysts know how to unravel earnings management. If they do not, 
CFOs are rational rather than heuristic in their earnings management efforts. Analysts’ answers 
to questions about the consequences of within GAAP earnings management and earnings 
smoothing in comparison with that of CFOs provide evidence in favor of CFOs being rational. 
Our findings suggest that analysts prefer earnings management actions that are easier to unravel, 
while CFOs are willing to take earnings management actions that are harder to unravel. We also 
show that, although analysts prefer to follow firms with a smooth earnings path, they dislike 
firms that intentionally smooth their earnings path, as these firms’ performance is like a “black 
box”. Thereby, analysts admit that they cannot always unravel earnings management practices. 
 4 
This finding also provides a better understanding of analysts’ incentives; analysts have to make a 
tradeoff between their reputation risk for overlooking earnings management by following firms 
that do not smooth their earnings path and their incentives to maximize forecast accuracy by 
following firms with a smooth earnings path. 
Further evidence on earnings smoothing suggests that analysts recognize the positive 
consequences for firms to smooth their earnings path. The more optimistic they are about its 
consequences, the more value they recommend firms to sacrifice to avoid a bumpy earnings path. 
Nevertheless, analysts are less optimistic than CFOs resulting in a willingness of CFOs to give 
up much more value than analysts recommend. In other words, smoothing to a limited extent 
would be rational for managers, but they appear to be heuristic in their overly optimistic view on 
smoothing, which can be costly for its shareholders. 
Overall, our evidence suggest that CFOs’ behavior can be interpreted as rational and 
heuristic: heuristic in the sense that analysts anticipate earnings management to reach a 
benchmark and that CFOs are more optimistic about the consequences of earnings smoothing 
than analysts are. CFOs are rational because of their focus on earnings and their preferences for 
certain types of earnings management and smoothing. Note, however, that CFOs of technology 
firms form an exception. The earnings of technology firms are more uncertain and therefore 
more difficult to predict. Consistently, our results suggest that the signaling function of earnings 
management about the firm’s performance might play a more important role than analysts’ 
difficulty to unravel earnings management.  
Our paper contributes to the existing literature on the endogenous interplay between 
analysts’ forecasting behavior and managers’ reporting behavior. According to the model of 
Beyer (2008), managers manipulate earnings as a response to meet analysts’ forecasts, while 
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analysts account for earnings management in their forecasts. Other papers that model the 
interaction between analysts and managers are Dutta and Trueman (2002), Fischer and Stocken 
(2004), and Mittendorf and Zhang (2005). Our comparison between analysts’ and CFOs’ survey 
and interview evidence allows a deeper insight into this interplay. For example, analysts focus on 
earnings as a performance metric and anticipate earnings management to reach the benchmark, 
whereas managers believe they should manage earnings to the benchmark, because if they miss 
the benchmark analysts perceive this as a negative signal about the firm’s future prospects.  
Our paper also contributes to the literature on earnings management and whether analysts 
see through earnings management. Existing evidence on the topic is mixed. Some studies show 
that analysts do not anticipate earnings management to achieve a benchmark (e.g., Abarbanell 
and Lehavy, 2003; Burgstahler and Eames, 2003), while other studies suggest that analysts 
rationally anticipate earnings management (e.g., Kim and Schroeder, 1990; Coles, Hergzel, and 
Kalpathy, 2006). Market responses to announcements of firms that meet earnings benchmarks 
also differ according to the necessity of earnings management to reach the benchmark.4
While our two main contributions are the enhanced understanding of the endogenous 
interplay between managers and analysts and of analysts’ ability to detect earnings management, 
 In their 
review, Dechow, Ge, and Schrand (2010) suggest that the difficulty to unravel earnings 
management to meet the benchmark potentially explains these differing market responses. We 
show that, although analysts anticipate earnings management, they are not always able to unravel 
earnings management, indicating a clear preference for the more detectable type of earnings 
management. 
                                                 
4 See e.g., Bartov, Givoly, and Hayn (2002), Hribar, Jenkins, and Johnson (2006), Gleason and Mills (2008), 
Bhojraj, Hribar, Picconi, and McInnis (2009), and Chen, Rees, and Sivaramakrishnan (2010). 
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we would like to emphasize the broader consequences of our results. First, analysts typically are 
the most well-trained and sophisticated users of corporate financial reporting. This implies that 
retail and institutional investors might even have more difficulty in seeing through earnings 
management. Second, analysts play a crucial role in financial markets as representatives of retail 
and institutional investors. Since analysts do influence market beliefs, our findings may reflect 
the market as a whole, hence, explain the differing market responses to firms that meet their 
earnings benchmarks by means of different types of earnings management.5
This survey demonstrates that at least part of the explanation is analysts’ inability to 
incorporate earnings management in their forecasts, creating preferences for the more detectable 
types of earnings management. With respect to analysts’ motivation, we show a clear tradeoff 
between maximizing their forecast accuracy and minimizing their potential reputation damage 
for not detecting earnings management. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe our research design and 
present the summary statistics of our survey data. In Section 3 we describe analysts’ view on 
earnings benchmarks and we discuss the value consequences of a firm’s real and accounting 
actions to meet an earnings benchmark. In Section 4 we explore the perceived implications of a 
smooth earnings path and the recommended value sacrifice to avoid a bumpy earnings path. 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
                                                 
5 See e.g., Brown and Rozeff (1978), Givoly and Lakonishok (1979), and Khorana, Mola, and Rau (2010). 
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2. Research design, data description and summary statistics 
We collect the opinions of financial analysts through a survey and additional interviews. To draw 
inferences on managers’ beliefs, our survey design is strongly influenced by the Graham, 
Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005) questionnaire, who study the opinions of CFOs. This enables us to 
compare our results with theirs. We received 306 usable responses (response rate is 48 percent). 
We corroborate the survey results and allow for further clarifications using interviews with 
financial analysts. We interviewed 21 analysts in four different institutions, a subset of the 
investment banks in our survey. Our survey design and interview set-up is explained in detail in 
Appendix 1.  
In Table 1, Panel A provides summary statistics of the analysts that filled out the survey. 
We find that 46.1 percent of the analysts have four to nine years of experience as financial 
analyst, and 34 percent have at least ten years of experience. The table also shows that 77.8 
percent of the analysts follow at least ten firms. 
– Please insert Table 1 here – 
Panel B of Table 1 provides summary statistics for the firm that these analysts had in mind when 
they filled out the survey.6
                                                 
6 In order to facilitate a comparison with the CFO sample in Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005) we also present 
the characteristics of their CFO sample. 
 We ask analysts to provide information on size, industry and number 
of analyst following for one particular firm, for which they answer all questions (see Appendix 
1). Almost 90 percent of the analysts focus on a firm larger than 1 billion USD, while 74.8 
percent of the firms are followed by at least 10 analysts. The majority of our analysts indicate 
that their firm provides moderate or more than moderate guidance, which is in line with previous 
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studies that show a positive impact of guidance on analyst following (Lang and Lundholm, 1996) 
and analyst forecasting accuracy (Chen, Matsumoto, and Rajgopal, 2010). 
In subsequent analyses, we document analysts’ responses to questions related to earnings 
benchmarks and earnings management. Because the current and future earnings of technology 
firms tend to be more uncertain (e.g., Amir and Lev, 1996; Chen, DeFond, and Park, 2002), 
analysts’ views on these issues might depend on whether they follow technology firms or firms 
operating in other industries. We perform conditional analyses that distinguish between answers 
of analysts following technology firms and answers of analysts following firms from other 
industries. We discuss the main results of these analyses throughout the paper, but for the sake of 
brevity, we do not report the results in the tables (the results are available upon request). 
 
3. Earnings Benchmarks  
In this section we aim to get insight into analysts’ preferences for earnings benchmarks as well as 
questions related to what they think would be the consequences of meeting or missing (short-
term) earnings benchmarks. This section finally discusses the perceived value implications of a 
firm’s actions to avoid missing earnings benchmarks. 
 
3.1. Performance measures and earnings benchmarks 
The survey results of Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005) indicate that CFOs believe that 
earnings rather than cash flows are the most important performance measure for outsiders. By 
asking a similar question to analysts, we can establish whether a group of “outsiders” actually 
views earnings as the most important performance metric. If so, managers act rationally by their 
focus on earnings. If not, they might be heuristic in their belief. Existing empirical evidence 
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suggests that managers are rational, as share prices behave as if the market is “fixated” on 
earnings rather than cash flows (Sloan, 1996). Block’s (1999) survey among several types of 
financial analysts provides preliminary evidence of a preference for earnings as well.  
Table 2 shows the top three rankings of importance that analysts attach to different 
performance measures.  
– Please insert Table 2 here – 
The results indicate that analysts view a firm’s earnings as the most important 
performance measure and a firm’s revenues as the second most important performance measure. 
Free cash flows rank third on the list. Although these results weight in favor of the conjecture 
that managers are rational (rather than heuristic) when deciding on how to report their 
performance of operations, this does not necessarily mean that analysts are fooled. Our 
interviews further illuminate analysts' preferences. The importance of earnings is particularly 
driven by investors’ interest in the EPS number, as an analyst puts it “..this is the metric the 
investment community has dictated..” and “..when I think of the Street, net income is most 
important." So, analysts’ client base seems to be a driving factor behind their focus on earnings. 
Furthermore, the interviews indicate that analysts consider free cash flows as important, 
particularly in mature companies that operate in capital intensive industries. Analysts further 
indicate that over longer periods, earnings and cash flows provide similar valuations, but the firm 
characteristics may evoke differences in shorter-term windows.  
We also asked analysts for their opinion about the importance of several earnings 
benchmarks. Even though CFOs posit that the EPS for the same quarter last year is the most 
important earnings benchmark for quarterly earnings announcements (Graham, Harvey, and 
Rajgopal, 2005), the results of Brown and Caylor (2005) indicate that CFOs act as if they try 
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harder to meet analyst consensus forecasts of EPS for the current quarter.7 In addition, ample 
evidence indicates that to increase the probability to meet or beat these forecasts firms guide 
analysts in making their earnings forecasts.8
Table 3 provides the analysts’ responses in comparison with CFOs’ answers.  
 CFOs have incentives to take these actions, as the 
negative market response to missing a threshold is higher for analyst consensus forecasts than for 
the same quarter last year EPS and avoiding a loss (Brown and Caylor, 2005).  
– Please insert Table 3 here – 
The results indicate that analysts attach the greatest importance to their own forecast (i.e., 91.7 
percent agree or strongly agree). The second most important evaluation benchmark is the analyst 
consensus forecast, suggesting that CFOs’ efforts to meet the consensus make sense. The third 
most important benchmark is the same quarter last year EPS. Analysts find that the previous 
quarter EPS and reporting a profit is significantly less important than CFOs do.  
Additional conditional analyses indicate that analysts of technology firms tend to rely 
more heavily on other analysts’ forecasts, while they attach less importance to same quarter last 
year EPS. In particular, of the analysts following a technology firm 92.0 percent rates the 
consensus forecasts of EPS as (very) important, while this percentage is 77.0 for analysts that 
follow firms in other industries. The difference is significant at the 5% level. For the same 
                                                 
7 Other papers that show that managers prioritize on earnings benchmarks are amongst others Burgstahler and 
Dichev (1997), Degeorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser (1999), and Dechow, Richardson, and Tuna (2003). And in their 
survey, Dechow, Ge, and Schrand (2010) summarize recent empirical evidence that consistently relates predicted 
determinants of earnings management to firms that just meet or beat analyst forecasts. 
8 E.g., Bartov, Givoly, and Hayn (2002), Matsumoto (2002), Richardson, Teoh, and Wysocki (2004), Cotter, Tuna, 
and Wysocki (2006), and Brown and Pinello (2007). 
 11 
quarter last year EPS these numbers are 69.0 and 53.0 percent, respectively (the difference is 
significant at the 5% level). Since reported earnings of technology firms tend to be more 
uncertain (e.g., Amir and Lev (1996); Chen, DeFond, and Park (2002)), these results suggest 
that, when firms are more difficult to value, analysts depend more on the forecasts of other 
analysts and less on static earnings benchmarks. Ramnath, Rock, and Shane (2008) suggest that a 
reason for analysts’ herding behavior may be uncertainty about a firm’s future performance. The 
greater reliance on consensus forecasts in the technology sector provides evidence of this 
behavior. 
 
3.2. Meeting or missing earnings benchmarks 
Several accounting studies show that managers have incentives to target earnings benchmarks, 
such as analyst forecasts (e.g., Healy and Wahlen, 1999; Dechow and Skinner, 2000; Fields, Lys, 
and Vincent, 2001; and Dechow, Ge, and Schrand, 2010 for surveys). The endogenous interplay 
between managers and analysts implies that not only managers have incentives to meet or beat 
analyst forecasts, analysts also have incentives to make accurate predictions of reported earnings 
(e.g., Beyer, 2008)). While managers account for analysts’ incentives, analysts are likely to 
account for managers’ discretion. The empirical evidence on whether analysts anticipate 
managers’ discretion is mixed. Although some studies indicate that analysts do not incorporate 
earnings management in their forecasts (Bradshaw, Richardson, and Sloan, 2001) and do not 
identify firms that manage their earnings to target earnings benchmarks (Abarbanell and Lehavy, 
2003; Burgstahler and Eames, 2003), other studies suggest that analysts rationally anticipate 
earnings management (e.g., Kim and Schroeder, 1990; Coles, Hertzel, and Kalpahty, 2006). In 
this section, we aim to establish whether analysts anticipate managers’ discretion in targeting 
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benchmarks and what are the consequences of this anticipation for managers or firms by asking 
analysts whether they agree with statements related to why firms should try to meet or avoid 
missing earnings benchmarks.  
Tables 4 and 5 document analysts’ answers to the questions why the firms that they 
follow should try to meet earnings benchmarks and why these firms should try to avoid missing 
earnings benchmarks, respectively.  
– Please insert Tables 4 and 5 here – 
We first describe analysts’ answers split according to managers’ incentives to target earnings 
benchmarks, which are related to stock prices, career concerns, stakeholders, employee bonuses, 
debt covenants, and potential lawsuits. We then draw inferences on analysts’ anticipation of 
targeting benchmarks and its consequences and conclude with what these results suggest about 
managers’ rational or heuristic behavior. 
We start with the stock-price related motives. Several studies suggest that the market 
views meeting and beating earnings benchmarks as important. Investors reward firms that meet 
and beat earnings benchmarks, but punish firms that fall short of earnings benchmarks (e.g., 
Skinner and Sloan, 2002; Athanasakou, Strong, and Walker, 2011). In addition, firms that 
achieve earnings benchmarks consistently over time are priced at a premium (Barth, Elliott, and 
Finn, 1999; Kasznik and McNichols, 2002), especially when this premium is an indicator for 
future performance (Bartov, Givoly, and Hayn, 2002; Kasznik and McNichols, 2002). However, 
the market reward is lower or even absent for firms that meet or beat analyst forecasts as a result 
of earnings or expectations management (e.g., Bartov, Givoly, and Hayn, 2002; Gleason and 
Mills, 2008; Athanasakou, Strong, and Walker, 2011), suggesting that the market at least 
partially accounts for managers’ discretion when targeting earnings benchmarks.  
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The analyst survey results in Table 4 support the importance of stock-price related 
motivations for meeting earnings benchmarks. The table shows that 88.2 percent of the analysts 
believe that meeting earnings benchmarks helps firms to build credibility with capital markets. 
Our interviews corroborate the relevance of this perspective. Almost all analysts explain to us 
that benchmarks are strongly based on previous expectations provided by management teams, so 
meeting benchmarks demonstrates the capabilities of the managers. In their own words, analysts 
say that meeting forecasts “..provides a signal about the management team. They should know 
what is going on in their own firm.” A large majority of the analysts (i.e., 87.5 percent) also 
believe that it helps to convey the firm’s future growth prospects to investors. Finally, analysts 
agree on the argument that it helps to maintain or increase the stock price (i.e., 77.1 percent) and 
reduce stock price volatility (57.8 percent). These results suggest that analysts believe that 
meeting short-term earnings benchmarks can have long-term consequences. 
Analysts’ answers to questions why firms should try to avoid missing earnings 
benchmarks (as documented in Table 5) provides additional supportive evidence of this view. 
The table shows that 88.5 percent of the analysts agree with the statement that missing earnings 
benchmarks creates uncertainty about the firm’s future prospects. This percentage is even higher 
for analysts who follow firms in the technology sector, compared to analysts that follow firms in 
other industries (98.0 percent vs. 87.5 percent, respectively). The difference is significant at the 
5% level. Almost 80 percent of the analysts believe that firms that fail to meet earnings 
benchmarks may have previously unknown problems. 
Although these results suggest that analysts infer severe problems from firms that miss 
the benchmark, our interviews indicate that analysts deal with missed benchmarks in a more 
sophisticated way. Most analysts carefully examine the management’s explanations for missing 
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the benchmarks. In evaluating these explanations, the credibility of the motivation determines the 
magnitude of negative impacts. Analysts verify their assumptions for the key value drivers of 
their valuation models. Missed benchmarks are considered negative, particularly if the analyst’s 
assessment of long-term cash flow changes. Although CFOs do not believe that missing a 
benchmark would lead to increased scrutiny of all aspects of the firm’s earnings releases, the 
interview results are in line with analysts’ survey responses that missing a benchmark leads to 
increased scrutiny (54.4 percent agrees). One analyst stated that “If a firm misses his number, it 
does not necessarily change the outlook for the business”. However, in line with analysts’ 
anticipation of managers’ discretion in targeting earnings benchmarks, 42.0 percent of the 
analysts believe that the firm may lack the flexibility to meet the benchmark. We learn from the 
interviews that the lack of flexibility relates to earnings management. If firms’ earnings are 
below the benchmark, they are expected to manage their earnings to be just above the 
benchmark. Hence, the missed benchmark indicates a lack of flexibility or that the gap between 
the earnings and the benchmark is too great to be bridged by earnings management.  
Meeting benchmarks has consequences for the external reputation of the management 
team. Previous studies (e.g., Puffer and Weintrop, 1991; DeFond and Park, 1999; Farrell and 
Whidbee, 2003; Mergenthaler, Rajgopal, and Srinivasan, 2011) show that managers are more 
likely to be replaced when their firm does not achieve analyst forecasts. Our analyst results in 
Table 4 show that 82.2 percent of the analysts agree that firms should achieve earnings 
benchmarks for the external reputation of the firm’s management team. Again, our interviews 
corroborate the importance for the plausibility of the management.  
Bowen, DuCharme, and Shores (1995) and Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) argue that if 
firms show higher earnings, they can get better terms of trade with stakeholders, such as 
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customers, suppliers, and lenders, since higher earnings can enhance their reputation for 
fulfilling the claims with their stakeholders. Meeting earnings benchmarks can have the same 
implication. Our results show that 41.2 percent of the analysts view the assurance of a stable 
business to customers and suppliers as an important reason to meet earnings benchmarks. CFOs 
attach more importance to the stakeholder motivation to meet earnings benchmarks than analysts 
suggest CFOs should do. Analysts’ client base, which mainly consists of one type of 
stakeholders – the investors – might explain their different view. An alternative view is that 
analysts do not fully account for managers’ stakeholder-related incentives to meet earnings 
benchmarks. 
Finally, and in line with CFOs’ answers, analysts do not believe that earnings 
benchmarks are important for credit ratings, debt covenants, employee bonuses, and the 
possibility of lawsuits.  
From analyzing the opinions of analysts and comparing them to the views of CFOs we 
derive the following insights. Analysts claim to search for reasons why firms missed their 
benchmark and that missing a benchmark for a temporary reason should not have severe 
consequences for the valuation of the firm. However analysts’ answers on missing/meeting 
earnings benchmarks suggest that they develop a negative view on firms that miss short-term 
earnings targets. An explanation for this negative view is that analysts anticipate CFOs’ 
discretion to manage earnings to a benchmark.  
A potential problem that arises from the viewpoint of the analyst is that he/she might not 
able to detect or unravel earnings management in a specific instance. That is why missing an 
earnings benchmark is perceived to be a negative signal about the firm’s future prospects: it 
indicates potential problems not known before, as management lacks flexibility to manage 
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earnings towards the benchmark. Our conditional analyses support the view that analysts have 
difficulties to see through the earnings number, because missing an earnings benchmark is 
especially considered negative for firms that are more difficult to value, i.e., firms that operate in 
the technology industry. Since technology firms probably experience less costs to manipulate 
earnings towards a benchmark, our conjecture is in line with Beyer’s (2008) prediction that 
market participants respond particularly negative to earnings surprises of such firms. 
As to the behavior of CFOs, these results provide evidence in favor of both heuristic and 
rational behavior. On the one hand, we can argue that managers act heuristic in targeting 
earnings benchmarks, since we show that analysts anticipate managers’ discretion. Moreover, 
CFOs seem to be ignorant of the possibility of increased scrutiny from analysts when missing an 
earnings benchmark. On the other hand, managers might act rational, because they can benefit 
from targeting benchmarks, while analysts’ anticipation of managers’ discretion does not 
necessarily mean that analysts have enough information to unravel this discretion and find out 
why firms meet or miss their benchmark. 
 
3.3. Value implications of a firm’s actions to avoid missing earnings benchmarks 
Given the importance of earnings benchmarks, firms can take accounting (i.e., accruals) or real 
actions to reduce the probability of missing earnings benchmarks. While both activities are 
costly, the two types of earnings management differ in timing and its effect on a firm’s cash 
flows (e.g., Zang, forthcoming). Specifically, accounting actions do not affect the firm’s cash 
flows, whereas real actions do. With respect to timing, if firms decide to take real earnings 
management actions to anticipate meeting earnings benchmarks, they should do it during the 
fiscal period. If necessary, they can adjust accruals towards the benchmark afterwards.  
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Empirical evidence shows that firms engage in accounting actions to meet earnings 
benchmarks by managing their accruals (e.g., Ayers, Jiang, and Yeung, 2006).9
The market rewards firms that meet earnings benchmarks.
 Other studies 
show that firms take real actions to meet benchmarks, for instance by means of a reduction in 
R&D expenditures (e.g., Baber, Fairfield, and Haggard, 1991; Dechow and Sloan, 1991; Bushee, 
1998) timing asset sales (Bartov, 1993), a reduction in discretionary expenditures and 
manipulating sales (Roychowdhury, 2006), adjusting advertising spending (Cohen, Mashruwala, 
and Zach, 2010), and repurchasing shares (Hribar, Jenkins, and Johnson, 2006; Myers, Myers, 
and Skinner, 2007). Zang’s (forthcoming) findings indicate that real earnings management and 
accruals-based earnings management act as substitutes.  
10
                                                 
9 See Healy and Wahlen (1999), Dechow and Skinner (2000), Beneish (2001), and Fields, Lys, and Vincent (2001) 
for surveys on earnings management in general.  
 However, the reward is 
higher for firms that meet the consensus analyst forecasts by means of real earnings management 
compared to those that use accruals management (Chen, Rees, and Sivaramakrishnan, 2010). 
Furthermore, firms experience a lower but positive premium when using accruals management 
(Bartov, Givoly, and Hayn, 2002) or classification shifting to meet the benchmark (Athanasakou, 
Strong, and Walker, 2011), while the positive market reaction is completely diminished, when 
firms decrease tax expenses (Gleason and Mills, 2008). Moreover, investors discount firms that 
meet analyst earnings forecasts due to share repurchases, although it helps firms to avoid an 
extreme share price decline (Hribar, Jenkins, and Johnson, 2006). 
10 Note, however, that the benefits are short-lived, as Bhojraj, Hribar, Picconi, and McInnis (2009) show that, on a 
three-year horizon, firms that miss the benchmark but do not manage their earnings (real, accruals or both) tend to 
outperform the firms that achieve their benchmark by means of earnings management. 
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In their review, Dechow, Ge, and Schrand (2010) suggest that a possible explanation for 
different responses to earnings management in relation to target beating is that some types of 
earnings management are more easily detectable than others. As a result, managers have 
incentives to prefer certain types of earnings management over other types. In the previous 
section, we argue that analysts tend to anticipate managers’ discretion in targeting earnings 
benchmarks, but may not be able to identify how earnings are managed towards a benchmark. 
By asking analysts’ opinions on the value implications of actions that firms can take to avoid 
missing earnings benchmarks, we draw inferences on analysts’ preferences, which we relate to 
whether they are able to identify earnings management.  
Table 6 displays the results. 
– Please insert Table 6 here – 
Our results indicate that analysts view real actions to meet the desired earnings target as either 
most value enhancing or least value destroying, relative to the accruals actions. The top four of 
most value-enhancing /least value-destroying choices are repurchasing common shares (rank 1), 
decreasing discretionary spending (rank 2), providing incentives for customers to buy more 
products this quarter (rank 3), and delaying the start of a new project, even if doing so entails a 
small sacrifice in value (rank 4), all of which are real actions. Except for the decision to sell 
investments or assets to recognize gains this quarter (rank 7), the bottom of the list contains 
accruals actions.  
Comparing analysts’ answers with that of CFOs shows a remarkable agreement. 
Although CFOs’ preference for real earnings management is not so surprising,11
                                                 
11 The Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005) interviews clarify CFOs’  preference by their fear of legal actions 
when regulators suspect earnings management, which is more apparent to regulators with accruals actions than 
with real actions. Even when earnings choices are made within GAAP, regulators can consider these choices as 
 from the 
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perspective of analysts it is, especially given the impact of real earnings management on the 
firm’s actual cash flows. An explanation for analysts’ preference is that they perceive achieving 
the earnings benchmark by means of real earnings management as a positive signal about the 
firm’s future performance (e.g., Bartov, Givoly, and Hayn, 2002; Chen, Rees, and 
Sivaramakrishnan, 2010). However, an alternative explanation is that analysts may have more 
difficulty to unravel accruals management relative to real earnings management. 
We find disagreement among analysts and CFOs on three options of real earnings 
management actions. First, they disagree on the share repurchase option. Our results indicate that 
analysts view a share repurchase as the most value-enhancing action that firms can take to meet 
their earnings target (the average rating equals 0.55), while CFOs posit that they are not willing 
to choose this option to reach an earnings target (average rating equals -1.02). In our interviews, 
analysts give two reasons for the value effect of repurchases, i.e., a signal of underpriced stock 
and the repayment of free cash flows. Yet, given that the repurchase transaction is designed 
merely to meet earnings expectations, it is not obvious why this transaction would enhance 
value. Perhaps analysts are positive about share repurchases, because it is easier to detect. This 
conjecture is consistent with the market discount of firms that meet earnings benchmarks by 
repurchasing shares (Hribar, Jenkins, and Johnson, 2006). The ease to unravel this type of 
earnings management might be the exact reason why managers disagree with the analysts. 
The two other types of real earnings management about which analysts and managers 
have opposite opinions are the reduction in discretionary spending and the delay of starting a 
new project. On average, analysts find these two options value destroying (with average ratings 
                                                                                                                                                             
earnings management with managerial intent to obscure true economic performance (Dechow and Skinner, 2000). 
And the consequences of being targeted for financial misrepresentation are severe for both the firm and its 
respective managers (Karpoff, Lee, and Martin, 2008a; 2008b). 
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of -0.28 and -0.56, respectively), while managers are willing to take those actions to meet the 
benchmark (with average ratings of 1.00 and 0.33, respectively). In contrast to the share 
repurchase option, managers might prefer these two actions, because they are less detectable by 
analysts and other market participants. At the same time, analysts might not be willing to admit 
that they have more difficulty to detect discretionary spending cuts or the delay of project 
initiations for the sake of achieving a benchmark. 
Our conditional analysis shows that analysts who follow technology firms have a 
significantly less pessimistic view on certain actions that firms can take. For instance, of the 
analysts that follow tech firms, 56.9 percent believes that decreasing discretionary spending is 
value-enhancing, while only 23.7 percent of the analysts in the other industries agree. The 
difference is significant at the 1% level. Technology analysts are also less negative about the 
value consequences of providing more incentives for customers to buy more products this 
quarter, the delay of starting a new project, and booking revenues now rather than next quarter. 
Although the ease to unravel earnings management to reach a benchmark with these four actions 
is not likely to be greater for technology firms compared to firms operating in a different 
industry, analysts might perceive these actions as more beneficial for technology firms due to the 
more negative consequences when missing the benchmark (as discussed in the previous section).  
 
4. Smooth earnings paths 
This section discusses how analysts perceive the consequences of earnings smoothing and 
whether they recommend firms to sacrifice value to accomplish a smooth earnings path. 
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4.1. The consequences for firms that smooth their earnings path 
There is considerable evidence that many firms smooth their earnings path.12 In the interviews 
with Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005), managers point out that more volatile earnings are 
directly related to missing consensus analyst forecasts (as earnings benchmarks) and, hence, 
create more uncertainty among market participants about the value of the firm. Empirical 
evidence that relates earnings smoothing to firm value is mixed. Although some studies find 
earnings smoothing to be negatively associated with a firm’s cost of equity (Francis, LaFond, 
Olsson, and Schipper, 2004) and positively with its share price (e.g., Ronen and Sadan, 1981; 
Myers, Myers, and Skinners, 2007), the positive effect on share price disappears after a string of 
earnings increases ends (Myers, Myers, and Skinners, 2007). Moreover, by applying asset 
pricing techniques, McInnis (2010) shows no relation between earnings smoothness and returns. 
The latter finding is in line with Verrecchia’s (2010) view that managers’ preference for smooth 
earnings paths is heuristic, in that their motivation to deliver a smooth earnings path is associated 
with perceived greater wealth.13
                                                 
12 E.g., Beidleman (1973), Ronen and Sadan (1981), Hand (1989), Barth, Elliot, and Finn (1999), and Myers, Myers, 
and Skinner (2007). 
 Other reasons to smooth earnings are, amongst others, to reduce 
the cost of debt and get better trade terms with suppliers and customers (Trueman and Titman, 
1988), to achieve bonus targets (Healy, 1985) and to protect managers’ jobs (Fudenberg and 
Tirole, 1995).  
13 Supporting evidence is the following text from Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005, p.47): “Without exception, 
every CFO we spoke with prefers a smoother earnings path to a bumpier one, even if the underlying cash flows are 
the same.” 
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We examine the consequences of earnings smoothing as perceived by analysts for the 
firms they follow. Table 7 shows our results. 
– Please insert Table 7 here – 
The results indicate that 83 percent of the analysts view earnings as easier to predict for 
smoothing firms, a majority of 56.7 percent agree that firms that smooth earnings are less risky, 
and 42.2 percent agree that such firms have a lower required return. As one of our interviewees 
puts it, “Smoothing lifts the valuation, because it increases predictability, which reduces 
volatility (..) a little bit makes sense.” Analysts’ agreement with managers suggests that 
managers are rational in smoothing their earnings path, thereby being able to fool a proportion of 
analysts. Yet, the significantly higher average rating of CFOs for the perceived riskiness and 
required returns of firms with smooth earnings paths suggests some heuristic behavior in that 
they think that they fool more analysts than they do in reality.  
Further evidence on CFOs’ heuristic behavior shows up in the disagreement between 
analysts and CFOs on two consequences of earnings smoothing. First, analysts do not perceive a 
smooth earnings path as being more informative about the firm’s growth prospects (average 
rating of -0.22), whereas CFOs do (average rating of 0.42). Second, while we see that the 
average rating of analysts regarding the statement that earnings smoothing promotes the firm’s 
reputation for transparent and accurate reporting, is  -0.06, CFOs’ average rating is 0.32. Thus, 
even though analysts acknowledge that smoothing can make earnings more predictable, they do 
not expect broader reduction of information asymmetries. We argue that CFOs are heuristic in 
smoothing earnings, because analysts as information intermediaries do not pick up the signal.  
In line with the theory of Trueman and Titman (1988), 43.8 percent of the analysts agree 
that a smooth earnings path can assure customers and suppliers that the business is stable. Again, 
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CFOs are more optimistic than analysts. Trueman and Titman (1988) also argue that smooth 
earnings could decrease the cost of debt. However, analysts vary in their opinion about the 
consequences of earnings smoothing for a firm’s desired credit rating: 34.2 percent agree on a 
positive impact on a firm’s desired credit rating, and 20.6 percent disagree.  
The interviews also show another aspect of earnings smoothing. Interviewees' argument 
against earnings smoothing is that it creates a “black box” for what is really going on in the firm. 
Put differently, one analyst told us that “In the long run, it helps their stock price because of 
predictability, but it hurts our ability to see what the fair value is.” This statement corresponds 
with analysts’ disagreement with the survey statement that firms clarify true economic 
performance by smoothing earnings (average rating equals -0.32). Considering the pros and cons 
of smoothing, we can summarize the general view of analysts by the following interview 
response: “We do not want them to smooth, but we love smooth earnings paths.” Thus, analysts 
like firms with smooth earnings paths in the belief that it leads to higher firm value. Yet, if firms 
with bumpy earnings paths start smoothing their earnings, then analysts dislike the fact that they 
cannot properly assess these firms’ businesses and thus are less able to deliver reliable forecasts 
and reports. This paradoxical finding suggests (1) that analysts admit that they are not always 
able detect how managers smooth their earnings and (2) that analysts are therefore forced to 
tradeoff their incentives to maximize forecast accuracy with a possible reputation loss of 
overlooking earnings management.  
Conditional analyses indicate that analysts for the technology industry are more positive 
about the consequences of a smooth earnings path. Relative to other industries, more analysts 
who follow high-tech firms believe that a smooth earnings path makes it easier to predict the 
firm’s future earnings (96.0 percent agree or strongly agree compared to 80.9 percent of analysts 
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in other industries; the difference is significant at the 1% level), makes the firm less risky (74.0 
percent agree or strongly agree vs. 53.3 percent; the difference is significant at the 1% level), 
assures that the firm’s business is stable (58.0 percent agree or strongly agree vs. 40.6 percent; 
the difference is significant at the 5% level), promotes the firm’s reputation for transparent and 
accurate reporting (48.0 percent agree or strongly agree vs. 32.4 percent; the difference is 
significant at the 5% level), and reveals more information about the firm’s future growth 
prospects (40.0 percent agree or strongly agree vs. 18.9 percent; the difference is significant at 
the 1% level) and true economic performance (31.3 percent agree or strongly agree vs. 17.2 
percent; the difference is significant at the 5% level). Overall, the difficulty of valuing 
technology firms and the uncertainty about these firms’ future performance appears to make the 
role of a smooth earnings path more important for analysts. In fact, our findings suggest that 
when analysts are less able to identify how firms manage earnings and therefore assume more 
negative (long-term) implications from missing (short-term) earnings benchmarks, they are more 
likely to deduct positive long-term information from earnings smoothing. 
 
4.2. Value sacrifice to avoid bumpy earnings path 
Given the perception of both analysts and CFOs that a smooth earnings path may affect firm 
value positively, we ask analysts how much value managers should sacrifice to avoid a bumpy 
earnings path. Table 8 presents the results for the separate levels of value sacrifice. 
– Please insert Table 8 here – 
Of all analyst respondents, only one third of our analysts believe that firms should not sacrifice 
value to avoid a bumpy earnings path. About half of the analysts believe that firms should give 
up a small amount of money and 13.2 percent (i.e., 12.1 percent plus 1.1 percent) believe that 
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firms should make a moderate to large sacrifice to avoid a bumpy earnings path. These results 
suggest that, although analysts recognize that there are some advantages to a smooth earnings 
path, they seem to be more focused on the long-term value of the firm. In our interviews, one 
analyst posits: “I don’t think firms should be that short-sighted. (..) The firm may experience a 
short-term dislocation in the stock price, but over time they will get credit for having the 
credibility.” 
We investigate the consistency of the analysts’ responses (in an unreported regression 
analyses). In this analysis we explain the value sacrifice by using the answers to the questions on 
the consequences of smoothing (as in Table 7).14 The results indicate that analysts are more 
likely to recommend larger value sacrifices when the consequences of smoothing are more 
positive.15
When we compare our results with those of the CFOs regarding the question how much 
value managers should sacrifice to avoid bumpy earnings we see a distinct contrast. Of the 
CFOs, 60.9 percent (i.e., 46.9 percent plus 14 percent) are willing to make a moderate to large 
sacrifice compared to the 13.2 percent of the analysts that recommend firms to do so. CFOs 
claim that “the market hates uncertainty” and provide share-price related arguments for 
sacrificing value for a smooth earnings path (Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal, 2005, p.49). The 
contrasting result on value sacrifice reinforces our argument that managers are heuristic in their 
belief that a smooth earnings path has more benefits than analysts believe. Hence, they are 
willing to sacrifice more value to achieve a smooth earnings pattern than recommended.  
 
                                                 
14 We estimate eight ordered logit regressions. In each regression we add one out of eight answers to the question on 
the consequences of smoothing, and we control for guidance, analyst tenure, portfolio size, firm size, and industry. 
15 The coefficients of the expected consequences are positive and significant at a one percent level. 
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Since our results suggest that analysts of technology firms are more positive about the 
consequences of a smooth earnings path, it is not surprising to find that these analysts agree most 
with firms to sacrifice at least some value to avoid a bumpy earnings path. Only 14.3 percent of 
those analysts do not recommend firms to sacrifice any value, compared to 36.9 percent of 
analysts following firms in other industries (the difference is significant at the 1% level). Also, 
22.4 percent of analysts believe that technology firms should forfeit moderate value to avoid a 
bumpy earnings path, while only 9.7 percent of analysts following firms in other industries agree 
(the difference is significant at the 5% level).  
 
5. Summary and conclusions 
In this paper, we examine analysts’ views on corporate financial reporting concerning earnings 
benchmarks and earnings management. We conduct a survey among 306 analysts and interview 
another 21 analysts. We also compare analysts' preferences with the perceptions and actions of 
CFOs from public firms, derived from the survey data used by Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal 
(2005). Since CFOs expect that they can enhance firm value by seeking to meet or beat analysts’ 
forecasts and by managing earnings to achieve this goal (Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal, 2005), 
investigating analysts’ views on those actions can improve our understanding of whether 
managers’ expectations are rational or heuristic. Managers’ expectations are rational when 
analysts are not able or not motivated to see through earnings management. Akin to Verrecchia’s 
(2010) definition, managers’ expectations are heuristic when they believe that managing earnings 
affects analysts’ valuations, while in reality it does not. Since analysts are not likely to admit 
whether or not they are able or motivated to see through earnings management, we structure our 
questions such that we can draw inferences about analysts’ behavior and motivations and about 
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its consequences for managers’ rationality with respect to benchmarks and earnings 
management. 
Our survey and interviews provide the following insights. Analysts tend to focus on 
earnings, rather than on cash flows, which, according to our interviews with the analysts, is 
driven by the demands of “the street”. Whether analysts or their clients are the drivers behind 
this focus, this result favors the hypothesis that managers are rational by focusing on the same 
performance metric. We also show that analysts find their own forecasts as well as the consensus 
forecasts the most important performance benchmarks, suggesting that managers’ efforts to meet 
those benchmarks make sense. 
Our questions related to reasons for firms to meet or avoid missing earnings benchmarks 
suggest that analysts anticipate firms to manage earnings to achieve those benchmarks. Though 
one can argue that analysts’ anticipation makes managers heuristic in managing their earnings to 
achieve the benchmark, analysts’ negative view on missing benchmarks also creates incentives 
for them to continue managing earnings.  
However, managers’ rationality not only depends on analysts’ anticipation of earnings 
management, but also on whether analysts are able to unravel earnings management. Our 
questions with respect to within GAAP earnings management actions and smoothing earnings 
shed light on this issue.  From analysts’ answers about the value consequences of different types 
of within GAAP earnings management actions, we infer that they prefer firms to adopt the 
easiest detectable forms of earnings management actions, while managers are willing to take the 
less detectable actions. We also show that analysts prefer to follow firms with a smooth earnings 
path, because it makes the earnings of these firms more predictable and it could enhance firm 
value. Yet, they don’t like firms to smooth their earnings, as it creates a “black box” for their 
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assessment of the firm’s performance. From these findings we infer that analysts are not always 
able to identify how firms manage their earnings, making it rational for managers to engage in 
earnings management/smoothing to achieve benchmarks. We can also deduce from these 
answers that analysts have to tradeoff their incentives to minimize potential reputation damage 
for not detecting earnings management with their incentives to maximize forecast accuracy.  
Although analysts posit that they dislike earnings smoothing, they are aware of its 
positive consequences. Accordingly, about two thirds of the analysts recommend firms to 
sacrifice at least some value to avoid a bumpy earnings path. Managers, however, tend to be 
much more optimistic about the consequences of smoothing earnings paths than analysts and are 
therefore willing to sacrifice a lot more value to avoid a bumpy earnings path than analysts 
would recommend. Thus, while a bit of earnings smoothing would be rational for managers, they 
tend to be heuristic in their too optimistic beliefs about its consequences and hence might be 
willing to give up too much value for this purpose.  
We separately analyze whether analysts following technology firms have a different view 
on a firm’s corporate financial reporting choices, because the future earnings of these firms tend 
to be more uncertain and therefore more difficult to predict. In line with greater uncertainty, 
technology analysts rely more on the consensus analyst forecasts. These analysts also have a 
stronger negative view about their firms’ long-term prospects when missing an earnings 
benchmark, suggesting a more widespread anticipation of earnings management within 
technology firms. This more widespread anticipation suggests that managers are heuristic in 
managing earnings, but at the same time it enhances their incentives to do so. Moreover, the 
uncertain character of technology firms’ future earnings and their greater flexibility to exercise 
discretion in reporting earnings makes it less costly to manage earnings and signal their 
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performance to the market through this channel. Accordingly, technology analysts are more 
positive about the value consequences of earnings management actions to achieve the benchmark 
and about the consequences of earnings smoothing. They even recommend firms to sacrifice 
more value to avoid a smooth earnings path than analysts of firms that operate in other 
industries. Thus, even though analysts anticipate earnings management to achieve benchmarks, 
the signaling function of earnings management might drive this anticipation, making managers 
of technology firms rational to engage in those practices. The difficulty to unravel earnings 
management seems to play a more inferior role. 
Overall, we can conclude that managers are neither completely rational nor completely 
heuristic in their perspectives on (short-term) earnings benchmarks and earnings management. 
Our conclusion requires a more subtle view. Although managers tend to be rational in their focus 
on earnings and their perspectives on earnings management and smoothing due to the difficulty 
for analysts to unravel earnings management, their heuristic behavior can be derived from their 
too optimistic view on the consequences of managing earnings, which potentially has negative 
implications for the value of the firm. 
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Appendix 1: Survey and interview design 
In this appendix we describe the set-up of our survey, the test for comparing our analyst results 
with the CFO data from Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005), and the set-up of the interviews. 
 
Survey design 
In the period July – October 2007, we approached the heads of the equity research departments 
of 11 of the world’s largest investment banks. After we guaranteed anonymity for the 
participating banks and sell-side analysts to their compliance departments, all institutions were 
willing to participate. Heads of equity research departments encouraged their analysts to 
participate by sending them an e-mail with a request that they participate and the link to our 
survey's website. Each institution provided us with the number of sell-side analysts that were 
approached. The total number was 638, with a median of 68 per bank. We offered respondents a 
copy of our results and donated $10 for each completed survey to a charity of the respondents’ 
choice. All responses with less than ten answers were automatically deleted. In the period July 
18 – October 30, 2007 we received 306 usable responses. Our response rate is 48 percent.16
A requirement for analysts that we include in our study is that they follow at least one 
U.S. firm. Therefore, we start with three questions: (1) Does the analyst follow at least one firm 
with an official listing in the U.S.? (2) What is the number of firms that the analyst follows? and 
(3) How many years of experience does the financial analyst have? The survey ends if the 
respondent indicates that she does not follow a U.S. firm. If the analyst has at least one U.S. firm 
in her portfolio, then a screen appears that says, “The goal of this survey is to compare your 
  
                                                 
16 The response rate compares favorably with previous studies. For CFOs, Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005) 
and Gibbins, McCracken, and Salterio (2007) have response rates of respectively 10.4 percent and 15.1 percent. For 
analysts, Block (1999) reports a response rate of 33.7 percent. 
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responses to that of CFOs of U.S. companies. In order to allow such a comparison we like to ask 
you to answer all subsequent questions for a particular U.S. firm. Please think of a randomly 
chosen U.S. firm in your portfolio and answer the following questions for this specific firm. We 
will refer to this firm as the firm you follow.” This approach allows us to compare the analysts’ 
opinions with the responses of CFOs. After this screen, the analyst goes through seven more 
screens that pose questions about earnings measures, earnings benchmarks, and earnings 
smoothing. Because the compliance departments did not allow us to ask for the name of the firm 
the analyst had chosen, the final screen requests general information about this firm. We ask for 
revenues, industry, number of analysts following this firm, earnings guidance, credit rating, 
price-earnings ratio, and the number years the CEO has been in office. The questions in this final 
screen make it possible for us to analyze the data for subsamples and enable a comparison of our 
sample of firms with the sample in Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005). We incorporate all but 
three of the questions17
A common concern with surveys is that respondents provide answers that do not 
correspond with their actual opinions. In our view, the set-up of our survey minimizes this bias. 
Although other studies have demonstrated that analysts’ objectivity and judgment is limited by 
principal-agent problems between firms and analysts, analyst career concerns, and behavioral 
biases, these effects are particularly relevant in actual reports, recommendations, and estimations 
of analysts for specific firms. In our survey setting, we do not believe that these biases play a 
 in the Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005). Hence, the tables in this 
paper provide the results of our analyst survey, as well as a comparison with CFO’s opinions. 
Our survey is available on upon request from the corresponding author.  
                                                 
17 The first omitted question is about motives to limit voluntary disclosure and is removed to shorten the survey. The 
second omitted question contains a hypothetical investment scenario, which cannot be answered by analysts. The 
third question is about the firm’s most important groups in setting the stock price, and included the analysts 
themselves. 
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significant role, because the answers do not affect client and management relations and do not 
require an analysis on a firm that will be published.  
We test for non-response bias by comparing the responses of early and late respondents 
and we find no evidence of a bias. In addition we test for a representativeness bias, i.e. whether 
the firms chosen by the responding analysts are characteristic of the universe of U.S. listed firms. 
Because we need to control for differences in number of analysts following firms, we download 
the number of analyst following and sales for all firms with IBES and Compustat coverage as of 
September 2007. We weight each firm in the Compustat file with the number of analysts that 
follow the firm and compare the summary statistics of this sample with our survey data. We find 
that our survey has a slight overrepresentation of larger firms. The relatively larger firms indicate 
that our sample captures the bigger players that have the largest effect on the U.S. economy. 18
 
  
Comparison of CFO and analyst results  
In our results sections we compare the average answers of our analyst survey with the averages 
in the CFO survey in two ways. First, we do a standard difference-of-means t-test (we refer to 
this test in the tables as ‘H0: Difference=0’).19
                                                 
18 A detailed description of the non-response and representativenss tests is available on request from the authors. 
 However, as Table 1 indicates that the firm 
characteristics – in terms of size and industry – differ between the CFO and analyst samples, we 
also regress the answer scores of both samples on an analyst dummy that equals one for 
observations from our analyst sample and zero for CFOs and on dummy variables for the 
revenue (size) and industry classes. Because the answers are given in distinct categories, we use 
(ordered) logit regression models. The tables report the significance of the coefficient of the 
19 This analysis requires all observations for public firms in the CFO survey sample. We are grateful to John 
Graham, Campbell Harvey and Shiva Rajgopal for providing their CFO data to us. 
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analyst dummy, which represents the size and industry corrected difference between the CFO 
and analyst answers (we refer to this test in the tables as ‘H0: Corrected difference β=0’). 
 
Interview design  
We corroborate the survey results and allow for further clarifications using interviews with 
financial analysts. We interviewed 21 analysts in four different institutions, a subset of the 
investment banks in our survey. All analysts mainly follow U.S. firms. We conducted the semi-
structured interviews in person in June 2008 over a period spanning almost seven hours. Our 
questions followed the sequence of the survey, but were asked in a general, open manner. We 
wished to have the analyst explain to us his or her preferences and practices. In addition, we 
asked several specific questions concerning results of the survey that we would like to have 
further clarified. In this paper we focus on the survey results and add insights from the interviews 
when an analyst's answer yielded additional insights. 
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TABLE 1 
Characteristics of surveyed analysts and the firm that they follow 
 
In Table 1, Panel A shows the frequencies and the percentage of the total number of observations per group of 
analyst respondents. Panel B shows these characteristics for the firm that analysts had in mind when filling out the 
survey. We also provide the corresponding statistics for the firms in the survey of Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal 
(2005). We consider only non-missing values in the calculations. 
Panel A: Characteristics of surveyed analysts                 
             
Number of years active as financial analyst   Number of firms you follow    
 N %       N %   
<4 years 61 19.9%     < 5 firms 20 6.5%   
4 - 9 years 141 46.1%     5 - 10 firms 48 15.7%   
10+ years 104 34.0%     10 - 15 firms 100 32.7%   
       > 15 firms 138 45.1%   
             
Panel B: Characteristics of the firm that the analyst follows           
                        
 Analysts  CFOs     Analysts  CFOs 
Revenue N %   %   Number of analysts N %   % 
<$100 million 5 1.8%  15.1%   None  0 0.0%  7.8% 
$100 - 499 million 15 5.4%  22.0%   1 - 5  2 0.7%  39.9% 
$500 - 999 million 11 4.0%  12.8%   6 - 10  64 23.4%  21.6% 
$1 - 4.9 billion 83 30.1%  24.6%   11 - 15  89 32.5%  14.1% 
$5 billion + 162 58.7%  25.6%   16+  116 42.3%  16.7% 
       Don't know 3 1.1%   
             
Industry       Guidance provided     
Retail/Wholesale 30 10.8%  8.6%   0. None  21 7.6%  19.3% 
Tech (Software/Biotech) 51 18.4%  13.9%   1. A little 28 10.2%  18.0% 
Bank/Finance/insurance 38 13.7%  13.2%   2.  33 12.0%  8.5% 
Manufacturing 27 9.7%  30.7%   3. Moderate 118 42.9%  32.0% 
Public Utility 8 2.9%  3.3%   4.  63 22.9%  13.7% 
Transportation/Energy 27 9.7%  5.3%   5. A lot  12 4.4%  8.5% 
Other 36 13.0%  12.2%         
       CEO tenure     
       <4 years 109 39.4%  36.9% 
       4 - 9 years 123 44.4%  33.0% 
       10+ years 42 15.2%  30.1% 
       Don't know 3 1.1%   




Survey response to the question: 
Rank the three most important performance measures that the firm you follow reports to outsiders 
 
Table 2 shows the three most important performance measures for outsiders. Under ‘Avg. points’ we present the 
average score where rank #1 scores 3, #2 scores , #3 scores 1 and not ranked scores 0. We also provide the 
corresponding statistics for the firms in the survey of Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005). We consider only non-
missing values in the calculations 
 
             
 Analysts  CFOs      




     
 #1 #2   #3       
Earnings/EPS 118 40  41 1.55  2.10      
Revenues 40 86  74 1.20  1.24      
Free cash flows 48 69  64 1.13  0.70      
Pro Forma earnings 50 36  32 0.83  0.52      
CF from operations 21 42  38 0.60  1.13      
Other measure 21 31  47 0.56  n.a.      
EVA 9 2  11 0.14  0.06      






Survey response to the question:  
How important are the following earnings benchmarks for your assessment of the reported quarterly earnings number of the firm you follow? 
 
The answer of the respondents could vary between -2 (i.e., not important) and +2 (i.e., very important). The table shows the percentage of respondents that 
answers not important (i.e., values -2 and -1), the percentage of respondents that answers important or very important (i.e., values +1 and +2), and the average 
rating. A higher average rating corresponds with more importance. The table further provides the average rating of the CFOs of public firms as derived from 
Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005). We calculate the difference as the analysts’ average rating minus the CFOs’ average rating. The first difference test 
provides the significance of the outcome of a difference-of-means t-test. The second test is the outcome of an ordered logit regression, where the dependent 
variable is the answered value and the independent variables are an analyst dummy that equals one for observations from our analyst sample, four revenues 
dummies, and nine industry dummies. The corrected difference β=0 is the significance of the coefficient of the analyst dummy.  ***, **, and * denote that the 
differences are significantly different at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
 






















(1) My forecast of EPS for current quarter 91.7 2.6 1.50 ***      
(2) Analyst consensus forecast of EPS for current quarter 79.3 9.5 1.05 ***  0.96 0.09 ***  
(3) Same quarter last year EPS 65.8 16.8 0.70 ***  1.28 -0.58 *** *** 
(4) Previous quarter EPS 42.8 37.8 -0.02   0.49 -0.51 *** *** 
(5) Reporting a profit (i.e., EPS>0) 42.1 29.6 0.13   0.84 -0.71 *** *** 







Survey response to the question:  
Do these statements describe why the firm you follow should try to meet earnings benchmarks? 
 
The answer of the respondents could vary between -2 (i.e., strongly disagree) and +2 (i.e., strongly agree). The table shows the percentage of respondents that 
answers agree or strongly agree, the percentage of respondents that answers disagree or strongly disagree, and the average rating. A higher average rating 
corresponds with more agreement. The table further provides the average rating of the CFOs of public firms as derived from Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal 
(2005). We calculate the difference as the analysts’ average rating minus the CFOs’ average rating. The first difference test provides the significance of the 
outcome of a difference-of-means t-test. The second test is the outcome of an ordered logit regression, where the dependent variable is the answered value and 
the independent variables are an analyst dummy that equals one for observations from our analyst sample, four revenues dummies, and nine industry dummies. 
The corrected difference β=0 is the significance of the coefficient of the analyst dummy. ***, **, and * denote that the differences are significantly different at 
the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
 
  Analyst sample  Analysts vs. CFOs 
  
























(1) this firm to build credibility with the capital market 88.2 3.4 1.26 ***  1.17 0.09   
(2) this firm to convey its future growth prospects to investors 87.5 2.7 1.22 ***  0.90 0.32 *** *** 
(3) the external reputation of the firm's management team 82.2 3.4 1.08 ***  0.95 0.13 **  
(4) this firm to maintain or increase its stock price 77.1 7.4 1.07 ***  1.06 0.01   
(5) this firm to maintain or reduce stock price volatility 57.8 15.3 0.53 ***  0.74 -0.21 *** ** 
(6) this firm to assure customers and suppliers that its business is stable 41.2 24.3 0.20 ***  0.50 -0.31 *** *** 
(7) this firm to achieve or preserve a desired credit rating 30.2 28.5 -0.04   0.07 -0.11  *** 
(8) this firm to avoid violating debt-covenants 29.9 31.3 -0.06   -0.28 0.22 ** ** 
(9) this firm's employees to achieve bonuses 27.8 34.2 -0.14 **  0.06 -0.20 ** *** 




Survey response to the question:  
Do these statements describe why the firm you follow should try to avoid missing an earnings benchmark? 
 
The answer of the respondents could vary between -2 (i.e., strongly disagree) and +2 (i.e., strongly agree). The table shows the percentage of respondents that 
answers agree or strongly agree, the percentage of respondents that answers disagree or strongly disagree, and the average rating. A higher average rating 
corresponds with more agreement. The table further provides the average rating of the CFOs of public firms as derived from Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal 
(2005). We calculate the difference as the analysts’ average rating minus the CFOs’ average rating. The first difference test provides the significance of the 
outcome of a difference-of-means t-test. The second test is the outcome of an ordered logit regression, where the dependent variable is the answered value and 
the independent variables are an analyst dummy that equals one for observations from our analyst sample, four revenues dummies, and nine industry dummies. 
The corrected difference β=0 is the significance of the coefficient of the analyst dummy. ***, **, and * denote that the differences are significantly different at 
the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
 
  Analyst sample  Analysts vs. CFOs 
  
























(1) it creates uncertainty about the firm's future prospects 88.5 4.7 1.31 ***  0.97 0.34 *** *** 
(2) there may be previously unknown problems at the firm 79.7 7.8 0.99 ***  0.49 0.50 *** *** 
(3) it leads to increased scrutiny of all aspects of the firm's 
earnings releases 
54.4 16.2 0.48 ***  0.07 0.41 *** *** 
(4) the firm may lack the flexibility to meet the benchmark 42.0 23.7 0.19 ***  -0.14 0.33 *** *** 
(5) it increases the possibility of lawsuits 8.5 58.3 -0.74 ***  -0.20 -0.53 *** *** 






Survey response to the question:  
Hypothetical scenario: Near the end of the quarter, it looks like the firm you follow might come in below the desired earnings target. Within what is 
permitted by GAAP, what are the value implications of the following choices for the firm you follow? 
 
The answer of the respondents could vary between -2 (i.e., value destroying) and +2 (i.e., value creating). The table shows the percentage of respondents that 
answers value creating (i.e., value +1 or +2), the percentage of respondents that answers value destroying (i.e., value -2 or -1), and the average rating. A higher 
average rating corresponds with more value creation. The table further provides the average rating of the CFOs of public firms as derived from Graham, Harvey, 
and Rajgopal (2005). We calculate the difference as the analysts’ average rating minus the CFOs’ average rating. The first difference test provides the 
significance of the outcome of a difference-of-means t-test. The second test is the outcome of an ordered logit regression, where the dependent variable is the 
answered value and the independent variables are an analyst dummy that equals one for observations from our analyst sample, four revenues dummies, and nine 
industry dummies. The corrected difference β=0 is the significance of the coefficient of the analyst dummy. ***, **, and * denote that the differences are 
significantly different at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
 






















(1) Repuchase common shares 58.0 13.6 0.55 ***  -1.02 1.57 *** *** 
(2) Decrease discretionary spending 30.0 45.9 -0.28 ***  1.00 -1.28 *** *** 
(3) Provide incentives for customers to buy more products this 
quarter 
17.8 56.8 -0.55 ***  -0.11 -0.44 *** ** 
(4) Delay starting a new project, even if this entails a small 
sacrifice in value 
17.4 58.5 -0.56 ***  0.33 -0.89 *** *** 
(5) Book revenues now rather than next quarter 15.0 50.3 -0.53 ***  -0.12 -0.41 *** *** 
(6) Draw down on reserves previously set aside 9.4 53.1 -0.63 ***  -0.45 -0.18 * * 
(7) Sell investments or assets to recognize gains this quarter 8.3 59.4 -0.77 ***  -0.77 0.00   
(8) Postpone taking an accounting charge 6.9 43.9 -0.55 ***  -0.72 0.17 **  
(9) Alter accounting assumptions (e.g., allowances, pensions, etc.) 2.1 78.0 -1.26 ***  -1.22 -0.04   




Survey response to the question:  
If the firm you follow would smoothen its earnings path, what would be the consequences? 
 
The answer of the respondents could vary between -2 (i.e., strongly disagree) and +2 (i.e., strongly agree). The table shows the percentage of respondents that 
answers agree or strongly agree, the percentage of respondents that answers disagree or strongly disagree, and the average rating. A higher average rating 
corresponds with more agreement. The table further provides the average rating of the CFOs of public firms as derived from Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal 
(2005). We calculate the difference as the analysts’ average rating minus the CFOs’ average rating. The first difference test provides the significance of the 
outcome of a difference-of-means t-test. The second test is the outcome of an ordered logit regression, where the dependent variable is the answered value and 
the independent variables are an analyst dummy that equals one for observations from our analyst sample, four revenues dummies, and nine industry dummies. 
The corrected difference β=0 is the significance of the coefficient of the analyst dummy.  ***, **, and * denote that the differences are significantly different at 
the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
 
  Analyst sample  Analysts vs. CFOs 
  

























(1) it would be easier to predict this firm's future earnings 83.0 8.5 1.01 ***  0.99 0.02   
(2) this firm would be less risky 56.7 22.3 0.37 ***  1.18 -0.81 *** *** 
(3) this firm would assure customers/suppliers that business is 
stable 
43.8 24.9 0.17 ***  0.61 -0.44 *** *** 
(4) this firm would reduce the return that investors demand 42.2 25.9 0.16 ***  0.55 -0.39 *** *** 
(5) this firm would promote a reputation for transparent and 
accurate reporting 
35.1 33.3 -0.06   0.32 -0.38 *** *** 
(6) this firm would achieve or preserve a desired credit rating 34.2 20.6 0.10 *  0.21 -0.11  *** 
(7) this firm would convey higher future growth prospects 22.6 38.4 -0.22 ***  0.42 -0.64 *** *** 
(8) this firm would clarify true economic performance 19.9 42.4 -0.32 ***  -0.05 -0.27 *** *** 




Survey response to the question:  
How large a sacrifice in value should the firm you follow make to avoid a bumpy earnings path? 
The answer of the respondents could vary between 0 (i.e., none) and +3 (i.e., large sacrifice). The table shows the percentage of respondents per answer. The 
table further provides the percentage of respondents of the CFOs of public firms as derived from Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005). We calculate the 
difference as the analysts’ average rating minus the CFOs’ average rating. The first difference test provides the significance of the outcome of a difference-of-
means t-test. The second test is the outcome of a binary logit regression, where the dependent variable is a dummy that equals one if the analyst provided that 
value as answer. E.g., for the answer no sacrifice in value, the dummy is one if the analyst checked “none” and zero otherwise. The independent variables are an 
analyst dummy that equals one for observations from our analyst sample, four revenues dummies, and nine industry dummies. The corrected difference β=0 is 
the significance of the coefficient of the analyst dummy. The corrected difference of all groups is the analyst coefficient and its significance of an ordered logit 
regression with the same independent variables as the previous regression, but with the value of the answer that ranges from 0 to 3 as dependent variable.  ***, 
**, and * denote that the differences are significantly different at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
 
 Analyst sample  Analysts vs. CFOs 
 percent of respondents  
percent of 




difference β =0 
None 33.5  5.5 27.9 *** *** 
Small sacrifice 53.3  33.6 19.8 *** *** 
Moderate sacrifice 12.1  46.9 -34.8 *** *** 
Large sacrifice 1.1  14.0 -12.9 *** *** 
       
H0: Corrected difference all groups (β) =0 -2.318 ***       
 
